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THE NEW FORDISM IN CANADA:
CAPITAL'S OFFENSIVE, LABOUR'S
OPPORTUNIn
By DANIEL DRACHE* AND HARRY GLASBEEK**
The breakdown in the links of mass production and mass consumption poses
problems throughout the advanced industrial world. In each nation-state the
ensuing struggles will take different forms. In postwar Canada, the link
between mass consumption and mass production did not lead to the same kind
of trade union participation in decision-making as it did in much of Europe.
Workers were unable to establish embedded rights of worker participation.
What was known as the fordist model in Europe did not have deep roots in
Canada. Canadian workers are now being attacked by employers whose
bargaining powers were never seriously blunted, aided by a state which has
never had to accord even a junior partnership role to organized labour. The
arrival of the new technologies is not likely to lead to more enriching work or
better pay conditions for much of the workforce given the logic of the
imperatives of an acport-led growth economy in which state planning takes the
form of encouraging private ordering. This paper concludes by looking at
some ways by which Canadian workers may be able to resist the downward
pressure on wages and working conditions created by employers seeking to take
advantage of their newfound power.
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I. ITRODUCTION
This is a period in which the internationalization of production,
the potential of new technologies and the associated ability to move
capital about, all show exponential growth. These quantum leaps
denote that a qualitative change in capitalism is taking place. The
global restructuring will lead to different adjustments in different
settings. Thus, the changes which will take place in Canada will be
constrained and shaped by the configuration of the Canadian economy
and its institutions. In this essay we seek to describe the likely
Canadian developments and the possibility of affecting them.
After World War II, social relations in advanced capitalist
nations had been labelled fordist by some European writers. The idea
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was that scientific management, or Taylorism, had enabled the
development of mass production techniques by augmenting the amount
of surplus value which could be extracted from employees doing
repetitive work in a highly directed manner. Ford's assembly line
provided the paradigm. But, scientific management merely created the
potential for mass consumption; it did not necessarily lead to it. For
mass production to become the norm, investors had to perceive the
likelihood and continuance of mass consumption demands.
Since the end of the second World War, guarantees of this kind
had been developed in Western Europe and North America.
Institutional systems evolved which stabilized capital/labour relations by
providing workers with contractual arrangements of indefinite duration
and with high enough wage rates to enable them to sustain consumer
demand at a level warranting mass production. Workers not engaged
in key sectors were provided with a social wage which allowed them to
participate in the resultant mass consumption economy. That is, the
institutional networks provided a necessary link between mass
production and mass consumption. This marriage of mass production
to mass consumption led to very high growth in Europe and North
America, lasting for a longer period than capitalism had ever before
been able to sustain.1
For a variety of reasons, the linkage between mass production
and mass consumption has broken down as economic growth has slowed
to a crawl. The consequence of this is that producers have sought to
find new markets, and to get access to cheaper resources and cheaper
labour. This push towards increased international competition has
intensified as new technological means and increased capital mobility
have made the internationalization of production much more feasible
than it ever was. This changed set of circumstances will be referred to
as the "new fordism," namely, the plethora of schemes designed to
increase productivity under the impetus of the new economic pressures.
I See, for example, M. Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation (London: New Left
Books, 1979); B. Coriat, L'Atelier et le Chronomdtre: essai sur le taylorisme le fordistne et la
production de masse (Paris: Christien Bourgeois, 1979); A. Liepietz, 'Towards Global
Fordism?" (1982) 132 New Left Review 33; R. Boyer, La Thorie de la R6gulation : une
analyse critique (Paris : La Ddcouverte, 1986). These scholars are at the center of the school
known as "r6gulation." For a review of this scholarship, see A. Noel, "Accumulation,
rdgulation, and social change: an essay on French political economy' (1987) 41:2 International
Organization at 303-33.
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There are, as yet, no international arrangements to provide
stability by linking mass production to mass consumption in the same
way as national regimes were able to do from 1945 onwards to circa
1976. Yet, capital must respond to the increasing, and seemingly
unavoidable, pressures of international competition. Employers will be
impelled to avail themselves of the new production technologies in
order to make themselves more profitable and will seek to have workers
accept new work relations. They will demand new forms of
organization in terms of more flexibility in respect to both the work
process and understandings about tenure of employment and forms of
payment
2
The reasons for having stable, long-lasting relationships during
which high productivity was to be linked to relatively high wages, no
longer exist. Nonetheless, the nation states' institutional frameworks
posited on these precepts persist. In Canada, collective bargaining has
been the primary institutional mechanism linking mass consumption and
mass production. It has been principally centred in the resource and
manufacturing sectors which have been relatively high wage sectors.
They set the pattern for the rest of the economy and were meant to act
as the motor for a mass consumption society. It is precisely in these
sectors that the internationalization of production and unregulated
international competition are having their greatest impact on Canadian
employers, causing them to attack the existing labour/management
relationships. Signs of the effects of these developments are already
clearly visible. As the core of the Canadian collective bargaining system
is being reshaped the effects will flow through to the rest of the
economy.
The thrust of this paper is that the likely impact of the new
fordist work arrangements in Canada is best assessed by particularizing
the context in which the readjustments are taking place. We will look
at employers' needs and their ability to demand that labour accept lower
levels of pay while producing more, as well that labour lessens its claims
to job security and to social benefits. Clearly, much will depend on (i)
the strength that existing institutional arrangements give the antagonists;
2 This analysis relies on the work of A. Lipietz. See, in particular, 'The Globalization
of the General Crisis of Fordism, 1967-84" in J. Holmes & C. Leys eds, Frontyar4 Backyard:
The Americas in the Global Crisis (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1987); see also M. Aglietta
& A. Brender, Les metamorphoses de la societd salariale (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1984).
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(ii) the availability of, and the willingness to use, innovative technology;
and (iii) the potential of capital mobility. Because the Canadian
institutional framework is well-suited to manipulation by employers, we
believe that, on the whole, Canadian labour is poorly placed to combat
the expected demands which will be placed on it. More particularly, we
will emphasize that, as a result of the pressures of international
competition on the core resource and manufacturing sectors, Canada
is already employing more people in the service sectors than before
and that this tendency will become more pronounced. It will be argued
that this segment of the work force, given existing institutional
mechanisms and attitudes, is likely to fare badly.
Canadian labour must develop responses to the new fordism by
promoting a new set of institutional arrangements which will allow
Canada to hold its own in the new world economy without sacrificing
labour's hard-won gains. Some suggestions will be made to further
thinking about the way labour ought to seek to influence the
development of policy instruments of this kind.
I. ASPECTS OF THE NEW FORDISM IN CANADA
A. Slimming the Work Force - Revetling to Harsher Times
The bottom has fallen out of the market for most of Canada's
resources. Lessened demand has always led to slimming of the work
force. This is happening again. Since the 1970s, mining and forest
industries have been shedding their work force wholesale. Overall, the
forest industries have lost approximately 30,000 jobs and mining has
seen its work force cut by 20 percent For example, MacMillan Bloe-
del had approximately 21,000 employees in 1980; today it has just under
12,000. At the end of 1980, Inco, Canada's largest nickel operation,
employed 18,000 employees at its Sudbury, Ontario and Thompson,
Manitoba plants. It now has 11,000 employees. Imperial Oil, Canada's
biggest oil and gas company, had 17,000 employees in 1981. It is
The Toronto Star (27 May 27 1986); for other specific examples see P. Lush, "Going,
going, gone" (January, 1987) Report on Business Magazine 36.
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anticipated that, when the current downsizing of its work force is
completed, this company will employ fewer than 12,000 Canadians.4
In the economic sectors dominated by the multinational
assemblers, smokestack industries and their satellites, it is the
globalization of production and the increased levels of competition,
rather than critically diminished demand, which create problems for
Canadian labour. For instance, Canada's auto producers face a
particularly difficult future as world-wide competition is spawned by the
many new entrants in the field, most of which enjoy much lower costs
of production than those which obtain for Canadian producers and
which have, at least, as high a rate of productivity. Here we refer
particularly to Japanese and South Korean producers.5  Rubber,
chemical and electrical industries also face a bleak future due to the
competition of imports from countries with labour costs which range
from 40 percent to 60 percent lower than those which prevail in
Canada.
6
Another threat to Canadian employment in the multinational
assembly industries comes from the availability of low wage areas in the
immediate vicinity. Whereas there once was a capital cost when moving
a long way away from domestic markets (such as to move production
bases to Southeast Asia), it has become the fashion today for American
industrialists to move from the north of the United States to the
American sun-belt states with their favourable labour laws and
4/bid. Inevitably, union membership, (if not incidence of unionization), has dropped in
these sectors. The kinds of unions affected include leaders and pattern-setters such as the
United Steelworkers of America (and their Canadian challengers CAIMAW and CASAW),
the International Woodworkers, Canadian Pulp and Paper, the fishing unions (on both coasts)
etc. Overall, the percentage of the work force which is unionized is remaining fairly constant
as more white collar workers than ever before are being unionized, but, as will be argued
below, to little concrete effect, as in the public sector their bargaining rights are curtailed and
in other areas they have little bargaining leverage. For the rates of unionization by industrial
groups, see Statistics Canada, Survey of Union Membership (As a Supplement to December 1984,
Labour Survey).
5 See, K. Ohmae, Triad Power: The Coming Shape of Global Competition (New York:
Mckinsey, 1986).
6 Canadian Autoworkers Union, "Can Canada Compete?" in D. Drache & D. Cameron
eds, The "Other" Macdonald Report (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1986).
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willingness to subsidize investment 7  Increasingly, the sun-belt states
themselves are coming under pressure as nearby Mexico has made itself
available for low cost investment on favourable terms. Thus, a large
number of American firms are choosing to relocate on the Mexican side
of the Texas border. By 1984, more than 400 large American firms had
already set up operations there.8 In due course, this kind of movement
will be devastating to Canada, as American branch plants in Canada
may well be the ones chosen to be closed down and their work
contracted-out to such cheap and readily available locations as Mexico,
Puerto Rico, Guatemala, etcetera. Since American branch plants
employ close to half the Canadian industrial work force, the results
could be disastrous.
Not only American-owned capital may move out of Canada.
Canadian capitalists may also seek to take advantage of cheaper foreign
conditions as a way to penetrate foreign markets. The threat of such
de-investment is a powerful bargaining tool and, indeed, actual dis-
investment only needs to occur a few times to make the threat credible
and effective. There has already been sufficient movement of capital
out of the country by leading Canadian firms (such as Dominion Textile,
Dylex, Northern Electric, Canadian Pacific, Noranda Mines) to make
labour very anxious, even if it is hard to show that all such movement
of capital has led to the loss of productive activity in Canada?
Under the old fordism, the institutional arrangements and
understandings did not countenance sudden, drastic reductions in the
workforce, nor did they envisage the large scale re-arrangement of
For a more detailed account, see B. Bluestone & B. Harrison, The De-industrialization
of America: Plant closings, Community Abandonment and the Dismantling of Basic Industry
(New York: Basic Books, 1982). In addition, note that The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 7, 1986,
reports that southern states have increased their share of foreign direct investment at the
expense of the Great Lakes and mid-Atlantic regions. Between 1974-83, offshore investors in
the United States have beaten a path to the sunbelt and the deep south as the preferred
locations to open new businesses. Not surprisingly, Georgia, Texas and Arizona, states with
restrictive labour legislation, had the fastest growth rates in attracting foreign companies.
8 See (1985) 6:16 The Multinational Monitor. Canadian employers are also reaching out
for Mexico's favourable conditions. P. Lush, supra, note 3, reports that, in 1984, Allen
Industries of Hamilton, Ont., "picked up its entire operation (except for the employees) and
moved to a low wage area on the Mexican border."
9 A. J. Cordell, The Multinational Firm, Foreign Direct Investment and Canadian Science
Policy (Ottawa: Science Council of Canada, Special Study, No.22, 1971); J. Niosi, Canadian
Multinationals (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1985).
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established work practices. The interest in institutional stability was too
great. Now employers increasingly feel that there will be no return to
the status quo ante once the down cycle has run its course. The
employers do not perceive the need, as they used to, to keep their
contractual relations with their workers on foot during a low demand
period even if it costs them little money to do so if they hang on to
their employees 1 On the contrary, employers have been responding
to the threat of foreign competition by seeking to compete on wages.11
There are many ways to do this. One way is the large scale dismissals
of workers noted above, unprecedented in modem times. Note that the
number of workers dismissed is not directly related to the lessened
quantum of demand. One of the features of the abandonment of the
understanding between capital and labour developed after World War
II (at least in the collective bargaining sectors of the economy) is that
there has been something of a return to a mentality more consonant
with the brute capitalism of another era.
One of the effects of mass dismissals, particularly, in sectors
where the layoffs are taking place, is to lower resistance to demands
made by employers on the remaining workers they employ. This
enables employers to extract more productive labour from each retained
worker than they had been able to obtain when trade unions managed
to mediate the more oppressive effects of scientific management. By
way of example, note that Falconbridge began the reduction of its work
1 0 The idea that contract requires mutuality of obligations had been accepted at common
law, leading to the doctrine that an employer suffering from an economic downturn could
terminate employees by giving appropriate notice, but not refuse to provide them with work
and have them standby until things got better. This meant that valuable, skilled employees
were often kept on the payroll, even when the employer had no profit-making work for them
to do; see Devonald v. Rosser & Sons, [1906] 2 K.B. 728 (C.A.). Under collective bargaining,
employers can put employees on lay-off during downtimes and have them available when a
recall would suit the employees, provided that the stability and maintenance of the relationship
is demonstrably desired. This is proved by continuing the payments of benefits (for example,
supplementary unemployment benefits, life and medical insurance and pension contributions)
whilst there is no provision of work. These practices have been enshrined in legislation, e.g.
Reg. 286, The Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137. The notion of the on-going
nature of the relationship, always fragile, is now being abandoned.
11 Lipietz, supra, note 2. We will indicate later on that to compete on wages is not the
only possible response to the new world conditions. It is, however, the most inimical to labour.
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force at its nickel mine in Sudbury in 1982. Today, according to
Falconbridge's President Bill James, "2,250 are doing the job of 4,000.'112
The work force reductions, in part, reflect the willingness on
the part of some employers to coerce and intimidate. In part, however,
achieving increased productivity with fewer people is also the result of
a new realization by employers, pushed by foreign competition and
lower domestic demand, that more efficient production methods are to
be used. This new realization leads to appeals by employers and
governments that employees be ready to accept the introduction of new
work technologies.
B. Working Smarter
Computer-based work methods will permit shorter-run output
and just-in-time production. This was next to impossible with the earlier
mass production systems which had broken tasks into minute, discrete
activities linked by machines and workers. The basic concept of this
form of scientific management was the notion that benefits could be
gained from economies of scale. It allowed for little or no flexibility.
Work was hierarchically organized and workers were alienated. There
was no commitment by employees to productive efficiency.
2 3
In calling for new methods of work, employers, who had
engineered and gained from the old methods, play on the regrettable
state of affairs they had created. Employees are told that if they accept
change, they will have much greater participation in the production
processes, more discretion and acquire new skills. This will require an
acceptance of the breaking down of job classification and seniority rights
12 The Toronto Star (16 November 1986).
13 We are aware, of course, that the picture we present is a little overblown. The crudest
stopwatch kinds of scientific management were abandonned long ago. But, despite the
introduction of psychologically-based personnel management techniques, the introduction of
administrative control systems - such as formalized grievance procedures etc., - we think that
the description of the work process in the text is an accurate, if generalized, one. See, H.
Braverman, Labor and Monopoly CapitaL The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); D. Noble, America by Design : Science, Technolog,
and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism (New York Knopf, 1977); R. Edwards, Contested Terrain:
The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Centuy (New York: Basic Books, 1979).
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which trade unions had bargained for in the past. They are now seen
as barriers to improved competitiveness.
What workers rightly fear is that the giving up of the protection
of the benefits they had won may leave them, and future entrants into
the work force, more vulnerable to employer exploitation. Trade unions
worry that if they give up their traditional bargaining stances they will
be marginalized and, in due course, that this will lead to a worsening of
employment conditions. There is a widely shared perception among
informed trade union officials that employers are using the climate of
the need for change to attack organized labour's position.14 Quality of
working life circles, work teams, small group activities, acceptance of
just-in-time inventory practices are names given to proposals which are
"aimed at harnessing and directing the day to day expertise of floor
workers and of supervisors towards operations' management and
refinement, ''15 something which, in unionists' eyes, is not an obvious
good. These perceptions are fortified by practices which, relying on
the rubric of greater flexibility and efficiency, have sharply reduced
union presence and bargaining power.
C. Two-Tier Bargaining and Contracting-Out
As noted earlier, some contracting-out out of the country of
traditional union work has already had an effect on organized labour's
position. Within Canada, as well, unionized employers have used similar
mechanisms, both to reduce their wage bill and the trade union
presence.
In the large multi-national assemblers and smokestack industry
employment situations, unions have been asked to make concessions
and/or to agree that, in order to maintain their own conditions at a
particular level, similar terms will not have to be offered to new
14 For an argument to this effect, see Don Wells' well-documented study, Soft Sell:
Quality of Working Life Programmes and the Productivity Race (Ottawa: CPPA, 1986).
15 Ontario Ministry of Industry and Trade, The Technology Challenge: Ontario Faces the
Future (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Industry and Trade, 1984) at 106. Canadian inspiration
for adopting such new approaches to worker-management relations frequently comes from the
U.S. See, for instance, "Auto workers, bosses study how to get along" The [Toronto] Globe
and Mail (10 October 1986) B2, and "UAW Learns Innovative Labour Pacts Can Run into
Rank-and-File Resistance" Wall Street Journal (5 September 1986).
[VOL. 27 No. 3
The New Fordism In Canada
employees by their employer. This form of collective bargaining, known
as two-tiered bargaining, is reputedly pervasive in the U.S.A. with its
dramatically fallen level of unionization, more so than it is in Canada.
But modified forms of it are quite common here. Canada's major
assemblers and manufacturers are serviced by many smaller plants.
Increasingly, the larger plants are commissioning the smaller, formally
independent, suppliers to do bargaining unit work. This creates a
downward pressure on the conditions obtainable by those who have
been known as the aristocrats of labour.
This is a clearly emerging pattern in the automobile parts'
industry. Recently it was announced that some 1,200 unionized jobs
were likely to be lost at Chrysler in Windsor, Ontario, because the work
they did was to be contracted-out, at much more competitive rates, to
Magna Corporation, a major Canadian non-unionized automotive and
electrical parts' supplier. Magna's labour costs were about 5 dollars per
hour below those paid to the outbid unionized Chrysler employees.
16
D. Flexible Work P-ocesses and the Need to Co-opt Workers: New Forms
of Payment
One of the aspects of the introduction of new work methods
is that it could give workers greater control over daily productive
activities. The power which workers thereby gain, precisely because it
is inimical to the interests of employers, will be sought to be contained
by them.!7  To illustrate that that power is real, note that workers are
in a position to stop production because they are quite literally the
operators of the switch which sets the assembly "line" in motion.
16 J. Daw, "Chrysler Said Sabotaging Windsor Jobs" The Toronto Star (23 September
1986) El. Gerald Mitchell, an executive of Dana Corp., a U.S. auto-parts' maker, has singled
out Magna as an example of how the two-tier wage structure is on the crest of the wave of
the future. His own company, which was once unionized, is following the same route in the
U.S. It has closed 30 of 60 unionized plants it had a year ago, so that it could undercut the
unionized automobiles workers' wage structure and win business which had previously been
done in-house by automobile manufacturers; The Toronto Star (27 January, 1987).
17 The policy of containment takes many forms. In the French car industry, management
frequently uses the introduction of new technology as the occasion to drive a wedge between
French workers and semi-skilled Moroccan, Tunisian and Algerian workers, by giving the
technologically more demanding and enriching jobs to the former, see "Dix-huit mois de
conflits A la chaine," Travail (Special Issue, no.2-3, June 1983).
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Contrast this with the older methods of fordism and taylorism under
which the assembly line technologically controlled the workers' activities.
This new worker control potential presents a danger to employers who
want continuous production and ultimate control over it.18 One way to
resolve the problem is to persuade workers that it is in their interest to
be "responsible," something that the development of a congruence of
identity of interests promotes. In this context, the enrichment of jobs
by the new flexible production methods which may develop the workers'
sense of pride in the product will play a crucial part. In addition, tying
workers' earnings more directly to their personal efforts by way of
incentive payments and bonus schemes will aid employers in their drive
to get employee co-operation. To assist them in attaining this goal, the
new pay schemes are instituted as part of quality of work circles or of
work teams, modes of production tailored to the adoption of new
technology and work methods. If these endeavours succeed they will
help to persuade workers to identify their interests as being more
closely allied with those of the employer than ever before.1 9
Adversariness will be seen as dysfunctional and self-disciplining as more
natural, indeed necessary, as earnings and peer approval will diminish
18 The contradictory effects of the new technology is explored in B. Coriat, La Robotique
(Paris: Editions La Ddcouverte, 1983) at 74-113. He shows that the introduction of new
technology sometimes heightens both productivity and worker satisfaction and bargaining power
but, on balance, favours employers at the expense of worker control and job security.
19 For general accounts of how worker pride and co-operation are seen as an integral
part of the economic restructuring, see W. Skinner, "The Productivity Paradox" [1986] Harvard
Business Rev. 55, and R. Reich, The Next American Frontier (New York : New York Times
Books, 1983). The use of these new kinds of work methods and payments have become
attractive to employers, in particular because they appear to have succeeded in Japan in
producing better quality products at reduced costs. For instance, the aforementioned Magna
Corporation, which is proud of its productivity record, attributes its success to its modern
attitude to work processes and philosophy, see The Toronto Star (13 September 1986). Magna
has 91 plants with a work force of usually less than 100 employees per establishment. But
something of the danger for workers which inheres in wage incentive schemes is revealed by
Magna's own operations. Managers have been given an incentive to cut costs as Magna
would like them to do because the profit-sharing plan devised for them is a very rich one.
Employees are not as well treated. Only 10 percent of the pre-tax profits is extended to
Magna's 10,000 plus employees as an incentive to work harder. Similarly, after American
automobile workers made concessions and accepted incentive schemes they found that
managers paid themselves multi-million dollar bonuses whereas their bonus was less than half
of the expected return; see The Toronto Star (April 14, 1984). These developments support
the stand taken by Canadian Automobile Workers' Union which, so far, has refused to agree
to overturn extant payment schemes.
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unless all the workers in a quality of work cycle or work team shape
up.20
. Trade Unionism's Dilemma
Understandably, the trade unions' reactions to these burgeoning
developments are mixed. They fear their own marginalization and the
co-optation of the work force; yet they understand the allurement of
the potential advances promised by the new schemes. In circumstances
in which their memberships are decreasing and employers are using a
variety of means to cut costs - such as contracting-out, new technology,
flexible production schemes and two-tier bargaining - it will be difficult,
if not impossible, for unions to develop a co-ordinated set of strategies
and responses. Unions have good grounds to fear that the advantages
which accrue to workers as a result of the introduction of such flexible
production methods may be more than offset by the eventual losses.
These potential losses include:
a. the inability to resist the logic of slimming the work force
once workers acquiesce in the idea that their employer must have
flexibility to remain internationally competitive;
b. when there are no profits, as is likely to be the case in many
situations, workers' gains may not be as good as those which could have
been obtained by traditional adversarial bargaining, that is, they may not
be as good as when workers take no responsibility for the welfare of
the employer's business or for that of the general population;
21
20 For example, Woodbridge Foam Co. Ltd., a major automobile parts' manufacturer in
Ontario, plans to base part of its workers' wages not on individual output but on the level
of production achieved by work teams. The company is relying on peer pressure to have
workers meet and, hopefully, exceed its production quotas; (interview with Vice-President of
Human Resources of Woodbridge Foam Co.).
21 How widely the workers' share may vary depending on the kind of bargaining approach
taken is shown graphically in The Ontario Task Force on Employment and New Technology,
Technological Change, Productivity, and Employment: Studies of the Overall Economy, Appendix
20, (Toronto: Ontario Task Force on Employment and New Technology, 1985). Ernest
Mandel has shown how invidiously trade unions are placed to make judgments about the long-
term welfare of an employer or that of the public at large because of their lack of any real
control over investment decisions and because of their lack of access to the real profit-loss
ledgers of both business and of the national economy;, see E. Mandel, '"he Debate on
Workers' Control" in Hunnius, Garson & Case eds, Workers' Control (New York: Vintage
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c. while one of the attractions of flexible work methods is the
lessening of employer authoritarianism in relation to daily practices in
the work place, the increased amount of control over productive
practices given to workers does not alter the fact that the locus of
power over the investment (its quantity, its quality, its permanence)
remains with the employer.22
In sum, what the unions fear is that the new work methods and
forms of payment eventually will lessen collective workers' resistance
because the need for trade unions will become less and less obvious to
them. New work methods are likely to reduce the confrontations
arising out of hierarchical relationships and, as a corollary, to lessen the
need for mediation by trade unions. Not only will the workers have
less need of a union on a daily basis, but also management's reliance on
the trade union as a manager of discontent will be diminished. This will
make management look less upon unions as a junior partner which is
there to help them stabilize the work place when it comes to
bargaining.P In the same vein, trade unions can expect less support
from their members when militance is required.
The ability of trade unions to combat the new work methods -
which they rightly view with suspicion - or to use their collective power
to defend wages and job security, is particularly poor given that the
outlook for increased employment opportunities in the resource, multi-
national assembly and smokestack industries is very dim. Similarly, little
or no employment growth is expected over the next decade in textile
Books, 1973).
22 See D. Wells, supra, note 14, for a discussion of the ways quality of working life
systems actually augment management prerogative over the workforce and workplace; see also
A. Goldsmith, '"he Impact of Police Collective Bargaining upon Municipal Management in
Ontario, 1973-84: A Socio-Legal Analysis" (J.S.D. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1986)
[unpublished] and H. Glasbeek, "Voluntarism, Liberalism and Grievance Arbitration; Holy
Grail, Romance and Real Life' in G. England, ed., Essays in Labour Relations Law (Toronto:
CCH, 1986).
23 The notion that, if employers and trade unions can be made to act in good faith and
to process disputes responsibly, a stable industrial relations' climate will ensue, long has been
the conventional wisdom of North American industrial relations' theory; see, for example, A.
Cox, "The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith" (1958) 71 Harvard Law Rev. 1401. The new
fordism de-emphasizes "responsible" trade union behaviour and demands "responsible" worker
conduct as a means to develop shared ideology and enterprise. This is what underlies the
trade union movement's intuitive antagonism to the new work methods and payment schemes.
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and clothing, agriculture, fishing and trapping, and transportation.24 The
direct reasons for this stagnation vary from sector to sector, but, in the
end, they are the results of the new economic pressures. Thus, in
transportation, the state, eager to promote the ideal of increased
competitiveness, has embarked on a programme of deregulation. As a
consequence of the implementation of this policy in the U.S.A., over
100,000 trucking jobs disappeared between 1983-1985.25 In Canada,
deregulation is leading to the expected downward pressure on the price
of road transportation. This is causing employers to attack labour costs,
not only in trucking,26 but also in the airline industry and rail
transportation. In the case of railways, the outlook for labour is
particularly poor. This segment of the economy has been undergoing
long term decline as Canadian governments have favoured trucking over
railways. In this setting, deregulation is the straw which may break the
camel's back. 7 In airlines, the outlook is also disturbing. Imitation of
American trends has taken its most overt form here. The upshot has
been an unprecedented series of labour disruption in the last two
years,28 as airline operators have attacked the prevailing wage and job
structure 29 On another front, in construction, which is, in large part,
24 The Ontario Task Force on Employment and New Technology, supra, note 21 at 149.
25 Interview with Mr. Robichaud, Executive Assistant to Senator Lawson, Chairman of
the Canadian Conference of the International Teamsters Union.
26 For the effects in trucking, see F.P. Nix, "Ontario Owner-Operators" Canadian
Transportation Research Forum (June 1987).
27 Interview with Michael Lynk, Research Officer, Canadian Brotherhood of Railway and
Transport Workers. See, also M. Lynk, 'Transport Deregulation : An Idea Whose Time Has
Gone" (1986) 9 Canadian Labour 12. Employers are making demands for great concessions
by workers in respect of wages and particularly in respect of job security; see, (1986)
Canadian Transport.
28 The strikes took place at Air Canada, Canadian Pacific, Eastern Pacific Airlines and
Pacific Western. The occupation of the employees involved was different in each, pilots, air
stewards, clerical workers and machinists being involved in the various disruptions.
29 For a discussion of the agreements made in the last two years by unions in this sector,
see The [Toronto] Globe & Mail (2 December 1985). The airline operators' efforts mirrors
those of the American airline employers who have had to operate under similar pressures for
a longer time. There the intent has been to make workers who accept the new lower level
entry rates to accept work practices which would allow them to be moved from job to job,
thereby saving the employer from the need to hire specialized employees as they had in the
past. In return for agreeing to these conditions for new employees, the bargaining union
members have often been given long term job security. See the experience at Delta Airlines,
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dependent on the business generated by resource-based industries, the
prospect for any substantial increase in stable employment is poor,
particularly as new technologies in design and engineering are
perfected3 °
Trade unions are poorly situated to change these trends31
But, as part of the economic restructuring, investment is switching
increasingly from the goods and resource-producing side of the economy
to the service sectors, creating employment at a rate which outdistances
the loss of industrial jobs in the traditional sectors. Do trade unions
and workers have a better outlook in these new sectors?
F. Seivice Industries
1. Growth
In the coming decade the majority of new jobs are expected to
be in service related industries, such as community, business and
entertainment services. This is typical of what is happening in all
Eastern, TransWorld and Pan American World Airways as discussed by A. Salpukas, "Cutting
Airline Labour Costs: Job Shifts Aid Productivity' New York Times (25 January 1984).
30 For a discussion of the possible impact of the new technologies on this sector, see M.
Piore & C. Sobel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity (New York: Basic
Books, 1984).
31 One manifestation of these trends is that the real income of wage earners has declined
in this new period. The national share of income going to workers in 1985 has returned
roughly to the level it was in 1971. Between 1971 and 1982 the national share of income
going to labour rose from 55.5% to 58.6% of the GNP. As a result of the onslaught it fell
back to 55.9% by 1984; Canada Department of Finance, Economic and Fiscal Overview
(Occasional Paper, 1985). The same report shows that wage earners obtained annual increases
of 3.3% between 1966-1977 and suffered an average annual loss of 0.9% from 1977 to 1984.
The figures for 1985 show that wages and salaries fell to 54.8% of the nation's income. Yet,
until fairly recently, it was the conventional wisdom (one which accorded with a stable, high
productivity/high wage entente) that wages were sticky, that is, not subject to downward
pressures. Another manifestation of these trends is the persistent high unemployment rate. The
official rate is just below 10% but, if discouraged workers who have given up looking for
employment were included in the official figures, the official rate would be closer to 12% of
the active work force; see L. Mucszynski, 'qhe Politics of Labour Market Policy" in B. Doern,
ed., The Politics of Economic Policy Vol. 40 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986);
"Unemployment in Toronto, Hidden and Real" in Working Papers for Full Employment No.1
(Toronto: Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, 1980).
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advanced industrial nations whose standing as industrial advanced nations
has ironically depended on their dominant position in the resource and
manufacturing industrial sectors.32 These figures become even more
dramatic when related industries such as banking, finance and insurance
are added.
Employment and Employment Growth in the Community,
Business and Personal Services Industry-Sector in Ontario
1985-1995
Industry-Sector Sub-Group Employment Growth % of Total
(000) 1985-1995 Growth
Services to Business Management 188 42
Accomodation and Food Services 138 31
Health and Welfare Services 52 12
Amusement and Recreation Services 51 11
Miscellaneous Services 9 2
Education and Related Services 4 1
Religious Organizations 2 1
Personal Services 1 0
Total 444 100
Source- Adapted from Ontario Task Force on Employment and New Technology, supra, note 21
at 147.
In Ontario, for instance, between 1971 and 1981, seventy
percent of all new additional jobs were created in the following service
sectors: business and personal services, trade, finance, insurance and real
estate, areas in which female employees predominate. Clerical, service
and sales' occupations together accounted for almost two-thirds of
32 A. Lipietz, 'Towards a Global Fordism?" (1982) 132 New Left Rev. 33.
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female employment growth; and clerical occupations alone accounted
for 40 percent of new jobs taken by women 3
2. The impact of new technologies on work and workers in the service
sectors
The larger scale employers will seek to avail themselves of the
advantages of the internationalization of production which is made
possible by the new technologies. Potentially much of the labour
intensive work can be shifted to off-shore production centres such as
Jamaica or Barbardos. Already American companies are creating
"offshore offices" to enter keypunch data and perform other clerical and
bookkeeping services. Thus far only low value-added American jobs
have been shipped out. But, the rate of out-sourcing is expected to
accelerate Some observers are predicting that clerical employees will
make up the next generation of displaced workers.35 There is yet
another pessimistic note to sound.
Ontario Task Force on Employment and New Technology, supra, note 21 at 60, 69
and 72. A study by Joanne Moloney for Statistics Canada (as cited in The [Toronto] Globe
and Mail) shows that, in 1985, employment in the goods producing industries was 6.5% below
1981 levels, whereas in the service sectors (if part-time work was included, see n.31 above and
n.40 below), it was 7.2% higher than it had been at the beginning of that recession year, see,
7he [Toronto] Globe and Mail (18 December 1986).
34 See 'The Hollow Corporation" (March 1986) Business Week 57. In the area of
insurance, companies are examining the possibility of contracting office work out to home
workers. It is estimated that 20% of office work can be done at home on a terminal. This
possibility, which can be exploited locally or internationally, will further limit the effectiveness
of unions to organize and to bargain. The scope of the potential for homework is large. In
the past the difficulty for employers was that product had to be collected and that monitoring
of worker time expended and quality of product was difficult. The new technologies do away
with these difficulties. An explosion of contracting-out practices can be expected; see B.
Berch, "The Resurrection of Out-Work" (1985) 37 Monthly Review 43, who notes the
increasing use being made by data processors of prison inmates, who come very cheaply and
work in clean environments (a matter of significance to the owners of delicate computers).
35 A complicated scenario is emerging. While the service industries are, for the moment,
the cutting edge of growth in employment, they may not continue to be so indefinitely. For
instance, Canadian Banking Association Statistics (Toronto: CBA, 1985) reports that, between
1979-1983, 20,000 low paying jobs were lost in the banking industry. More automation may
lead to the displacement of 10% of the existing work force in the banks. Eventually, the
ability of the service sectors, as a whole, to absorb displaced workers from the industrial
segments will be sharply reduced with the increased utilization of labour-saving technology;
see W. Leontieff, 'Technological Advance, Economic Growth and the Distribution of Income"
(1983) 9:3 Population and Development Review.
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Inasmuch as the expansion of these sectors and the flexibility
of the employers is due to the introduction of new office computer-
based technology, it gives employers an enormously enhanced
supervisory power over their work forces. This is so because work can
be monitored by stroke-counting and automatic error-checking
mechanisms. Thus, while it is true that some increased skills will be
required by workers in these sectors, once these skills have been learned
the operators of these new machines will be given no discretion and will
be subjugated to never-ending supervision.36 This kind of "flexible" work
process diminishes worker control. In contrast with some of the new
quality of work circlesAvork team types of production systems in other
segments of the economy, old-style taylorism will be reinvigorated in the
service sectors. This will occur precisely in the only sectors where, in
the immediate future, job opportunities will actually increase. The new
work methods, then, amount to the establishment of the old fordism in
segments of industry where this has not been the dominant work
process method.
3. The potential for worker organization and resistance in the service
sectors
These have been traditionally low skill and low pay sectors. On
average, service industry jobs pay fifteen to twenty percent less than do
industrial jobs!7 As these sectors grow, it will be necessary, more than
ever before, for workers to unionize. The incidence of unionization in
this sector, however, has always been low. By 1981, in trade only 8.9
percent of the work force had been unionized, in finance 2.8 percent
and in services 25.6 percent 8 In recent times, there has been a sharp
increase in organization.3 9 While the gains made are encouraging, it is
36 The new fordism work relationship in the service sectors is lucidly analysed by D.
Wells, The Soft Sell, supra, note 14.
37 See the special issue of Business Week, "The Hollow Corporation," supra, note 34.
38 Canada, Royal Commission on Equality in Employment, Equality in Employment
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1984) at 76 (Table 12).
39 Trade unionism had moved to 9.8% in trade; had dropped to 2.7% in finance; and
had increased to 32.9% in services industries by 1984; see, Corporations and Labour Unions
Reporting Act; Annual Report (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1984).
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likely that the difficulties for further organization will prove to be
formidable in the dominant corporate sectors of the service industries,
such as banking, insurance and large financial undertakings. Consider
the following:
a. The work force in these sectors is disproportionately female
and part-time.4° In Ontario, women's share of full-time employment has
been declining every year since 1975, while their share of part-time work
has been increasing. By 1983, fully 26 percent of all women in Ontario
in the work force worked on a part-time basis 1
b. In the past, unionization has failed, in part at least, because
of the lack of interest by male-dominated resource and industrial-based
American unions in organizing female, low skill workers in other
segments.42 This may be attributed, in part, no doubt, to the cultural
backwardness of established unionism, but also in part to the concrete
difficulties inhibiting organization when it is to be conducted on a plant-
by-plant basis. This imposes high administrative costs. The American-
based unions which operate in Canada cost out their operations by
balancing the dues they collect from each unit - in respect of which
they have to bargain and whose agreements they must administer
separately - against the expenditures incurred in acting as a bargaining
agent for that very unit. But as trade unions are losing ground in the
traditional sectors, these calculations may well be having different
40 See The Ontario Task Force on Employment and New Technology, Final Report,
supra, note 21. Statistics Canada reported that, as of December, 1986, there were a total of
1.84 million part-time workers, of whom more than 500,000 were involuntary part-time
workers. Most of these people were women and young people; as summarized in The Toronto
Star (22 January 1987). This explains another phenomenon: despite our description of "bad
times for labour," since the deep recession of 1981-82 Canada has had an apparently strong
growth in employment, but, now we see that at least one third of that growth has been due
to self-employment and part-time work; P. Kumar, The Economy: Summary Outline in Wood
& Kumar eds, The Current Industrial Relations Scene in Canada, 1985 (Kingston, Ont.:
Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1985).
41 See Appendix 1, "Labour Market Trends in Ontario 1950-1980" by the Ontario Task
Force on Employment and New Technology, supra, note 21.
42 As a result, the differential in wage rates between male and female in the
non-unionized sector is strikingly higher than in the unionized sector. Low wages paid to
women in the largely unorganized retail and financial sectors account for much of the wage
inequality. In 1981 men were paid $9.57 per hour in non-unionized jobs compared to $7.04
for women; see Commission on Equality in Employment, Equality in Employment: A Royal
Commission Report, supra, note 38.
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outcomes today which, in part, may be reflected in the increasing
incidence of unionization in the female segments of the workforce.43
c. Labour relations boards have made it more difficult for those
trade unions formed spontaneously by the rank and file to gain
certification than they have for established trade unions to do so.
Spontaneously formed trade unions must prove to cautious labour
relations boards that they conform with stringent legislative
requirements. This is very difficult for workers who often must organize
in secret because of employer resistance. This has made it practical for
workers in the service sectors to depend on the leadership of established
unions which until recently had been loath to provide it. It may be that
the unions' need for growth and the increased importance of the service
industries may lessen the significance of this barrier to organization.
d. While union diffidence towards service sector organization
has been diminishing, employer recalcitrance has not. Large employers,
in particular, have been helped in justifying their opposition to
unionization, (which is reflected by their manipulation of labour
relations' practices), by the strident ideological anti-unionism of small
business in the service industries. The latter's loudly trumpeted tenets
of rugged entrepreneurialism have aided in creating and maintaining a
pervasively held view that a low-skilled, part-time, largely female work
force does not deserve any better treatment than it has been given. 4
Large employers have been aided in their anti-union campaigns by the
fact that the high rates of unemployment and lowering wages have
forced more and more of precisely these kinds of employees into the
Note that small business represented the largest single source of growth in the retail,
financial and business sectors of the economy; Minister of State, Small Business and Tourism,
Statistical Profile for Small Business in Canada 1983 (Toronto: Ministry of State for Small
Business and Tourism, 1983) at 39. Whereas once these business unionism-type arguments
might have been used to rationalize the instinctive reluctance of some of the more
conservative trade union elements to organize women, both new social awareness and the need
for members may be changing this.
44 At a time when the maturing feminist movement is pressing for pay equity legislation
(first promised by Canada as a High Contracting Party to the Treaty of Versailles in 1919)
small business leads the charge to retard what electorally responsible politicians have accepted
as an irresistible claim; see the recent pay equity struggle in Ontario which has led the
provincial government to offer legislation which will delay pay equity implementation for up
to 6 years and which eventually might cover less than 50% of the female work force in the
private sector:. An Act to Provide for Pay Equity, S.O. 1987, c. 34.
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labour market45  This is well illustrated by the recent attempts to
unionize the banks.
Initially, when banks were faced with organization drives they
were able to argue, successfully, that a majority of workers at all their
branches had to be in favour of joining a designated union before
certification could be granted by a labour relations board. Given the
multiplicity of branches of nationally chartered banks this was an
impossible hurdle for unions to clear. Ironically, therefore, it was the
workers who had to make, and win, the argument that plant-by-plant
organization - that is, the kind of organization envisioned by the model
of collective bargaining based on the notion of a multitude of atomized
employment situations - should be sufficient. After a brave fight, a
small group of British Columbian female bank workers won this
argument. Now bank workers have to launch bids for certification at
the hundreds of branches each of the banks have throughout the
country. The banks, intransigent as always, do not hesitate to menace,
intimidate and deceive at the branch level.47 Unions have made no real
inroads. After 10 years of immense effort less than 5000 bank workers
have been organized out of a work force approaching 200,000.48
Unionization has failed precisely because large and financially integrated
operations, such as those of a bank, are treated as if they constituted a
series of discrete small employment situations. This permits banks to act
like primitive, small employers, that is, as the worst of backward
45 As male income earners have suffered reductions in income this has had to be offset
by women entering the work force. In 1986, the national average increment in wages was
2.3%, while the inflation rate was 4%; The Financial Post (14 June 1986). With real incomes
flat or falling since 1981, it has become obligatory for a working class family to have a second
income.
46 See P.C. Weiler, Reconcilable Differences: New Directions in Canadian Labour Law
(Toronto: Carswell, 1980).
47 The Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (C.I.B.C.) has almost been a caricature
of a red-neck employer, see Union of Bank Employees, Local 2104 v. C.LB.C (1980), 80
C.L.L.C. 16,002, and Union of Bank Employees, Local 2104 v. C.LB.C. (1985), 85 C.L.L.C.
16,021. The intransigence of this bank led the union movement as a whole to support some
of the bank's striking VISA credit card workers to the extent of paying them more strike pay
than they earned as employees of the bank. Eventually this forced the hand of the labour
relations board and a contract was imposed after the bank had to apologize publicly for some
of its stand-over tactics, see Union of Bank Employees, Local 2104 v. C.LB.C. (1986), 86
C.LL.C. 16,023.
48 The fToronto] Globe & Mail (18 March 1986).
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ideologues who are not embarrassed to brow-beat and intimidate their
largely female work forces.
II. THE CANADIAN STATE AND NEW FORDISM
In a liberal democracy it is the assumption that the state and
its agencies can affect economic and political developments. The
question is whether the Canadian state is likely to promote, inhibit or
modify the trends in economic restructuring which we have described.
The Canadian state has always understood its task to be to use
both its significant market position49 and its political legitimacy (which,
in part, stems from its public service face) to further the interests of
leading capital interests in the resource and related manufacturing
sectors.5 ° This has meant direct and indirect subsidies for, and labour
market management strategies aimed at supporting, investor needs in
these sectors. Traditional export-oriented industries, such as mining and
forestry, received the largest share of government assistance in the form
of tax credits and reductions in the seventies and eighties. By contrast,
small, innovative firms who are chronically and desperately short of
funds were cut out or ignored by government programmesO Ottawa's
By way of indication, note that federal state institutions involved in productive
activities employ a great number of people. In the early 1980s, Canada's 40 Crown
Corporations and 130 subsidiaries accounted for $40 billion in assets and employed more
than 200,000 people; J.K. Laux & M. Appel Malot, State Capitalism: Comparative Perspective
on Public Enterprise in Canada (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987); see also R.M.
Bird, Financing Canadian Government: A Quantitative Overview (Toronto: Canadian Tax
Foundation, 1979).
50 The major Canadian State policy is one of a commitment to export-led growth. The
idea is that the sale of unprocessed (or largely unprocessed) staples will lead to an inflow of
capital which will be invested in the manufacturing sector to supply domestic demand. The
accuracy of this characterization of the role of the Canadian State has been well established
by Harold Innis' pioneering studies; see, H.A. Innis, Essays in Canadian Economic History,
ed. by M.Q. Innis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956). For more recent work, see
I. Levitt, Silent Surrender (Toronto: MacMillan, 1970); Secretariat for the Planning and
Priorities Committee of Cabinet, Report on Natural Resources Policy in Manitoba,by E.W.
Kierans (Winnipeg, Man.: Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet, Queen's Printer,
1973).
51 P.Faucher & R. Young, "Le d6clin manufacterire et Ia politique industrielle au
Canada" in D. Bellemare & C. Saint-Pierre eds, Les strategies de reprise (Ste-Hubert, Quebec:
Editions Saint-Martin, 1984).
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largesse in subsidizing the private sector directly and indirectly is
enormous in dollar terms. The Right Honourable James Kelleher, the
federal Secretary of State for Finance, has recently tabled papers in
Parliament which show that subsidies via tax expenditures, such as direct
exemptions, specific credits, deferrals, specific diminished tax rates and
other such measures, cost the government a staggering 28 billion dollars
annually.52
Both the Canadian state and the leading employers in the
industrial sectors seem bent on a continuation of the export-led growth
mechanisms. This means, of course, that the state, as we shall show,
sees it as its role to help employers cut wage costs in order to compete,
particularly in the North American market. The state has
misunderstood the implications of the new fordism. Canada as a nation
can no longer afford to be at the mercy of internationally-generated and
controlled demand and production. For the economy as a whole to be
competitive adjustments must be made which make the most of
Canada's special advantages and the new technologies. This requires
state intervention on a massive scale in respect of upgrading and
modernizing specifically chosen segments of the economy. Although
state officials frequently talk about the need for investment in high
technology and the development of special niches for Canadian
industries, this is not state policy. As has already been noted, the
dominant policies of export-led growth remain embedded in state
activities.
The difficulty is that the state finds it harder to obtain revenues
needed for the subsidization of export-led growth precisely because of
the economic upheaval. This is so, in part, because by indirectly
subsidizing capital, the state has gradually collected less revenue from
the corporate sector. In 1985, approximately 11 percent of government
revenues came from corporate income tax compared with over 36
percent from personal taxes. In 1950, the government collected 21
percent of its revenues from employers while individual income earners
52 See also D. Wolfe, "he Politics of the Deficit" in G.B. Doern, ed., The Politics of
Economic Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) Vol. 40; Services and Subsidies
to Business: Giving With Both Hands, A Study Team Report to the Task Force on Program
Review (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1986), which identifies 57 subsidy
programmes that cost Ottawa a total of between $4.5 billion and $7.7 billion in foregone
federal revenues.
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contributed 19.6 percent of government revenue.53 In part, the
increased need for welfare, combined with a low (and lowering) income
base of the general working population as a result of the economic
crisis, has squeezed the state's ability to deliver subsidies to capital.
In response, the state has sought to reduce spending on the
provision of welfare, despite the fact that Canada's spending on welfare,
at a rate of 20.2 percent of its gross domestic product, is the lowest of
the Group of Seven countries s4 But the state response has other
prongs as well. In particular, the state has also sought to reduce its
expenditures by attacking the organizational rights of public servants.
This has a valuable side effect: it provides ideological support for the
private sector's attacks on its workers. All of this requires some
elaboration.
A. Reshaping the Labour Market - The Case of Unemployment55
The state has taken an active role in reshaping the labour
market by promoting a particular ideological thrust and by concretely
weakening segments of the work force. The increasing number of
unemployed, paradoxically, has caused a launching of an invigorated
attack on them. Both the level and the availability of unemployment
insurance benefits have come under fire. To bolster the legitimacy of
the attack (which had come under challenge) the federal government set
53 See J. Calvert, 'the Attack on the Public Sector" (1982) 4 The Facts 24.
54 These countries are the United States, Japan, West Germany, France, Britain, Italy
and Canada; see The Toronto Star (30 September 1986).
55 The attack on the unemployed as "undeserving" people has long been part and parcel
of state tactics. R.A. Hasson, in a seminal article, has shown that it becomes increasingly
virulent as unemployment increases, in line with the argument in the text that the state has
an agenda when it employs such tactics; see R.A. Hasson "Discipline and Punishment in the
Law of Unemployment Insurance - A Critical View of Disqualifications and Disentitlement"
(1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 615. Unemployment is not the only kind of entitlement attacked.
It is being used as a major illustration. Note that, in 1985, the federal government sought to
de-index public pension benefits as part of its attack on individual entitlements. It was forced
to back down in the face of an unprecedented co-ordinated challenge by senior citizens. This
illustrates both the point made in the text and also the fact that, in a liberal democratic
capitalist nation, the state is always somewhat curtailed by the fact that, to be in a position
to enhance capital accumulation, it must be seen as a legitimate guardian of the general
welfare.
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up a Commission of Inquiry, (the Forget Commission), which was given
the task of finding a way to "rationalize" the unemployment insurance
scheme. This Commission has now reported56 and it seems as if its
recommendations are unlikely to be given effect. This is largely because
they would lead to a serious undermining of entitlements and would put
provincial governments in a position where they would have to increase
their welfare expenditures, an unpalatable policy for the federal
government to advocate.57 Nonetheless, the mere fact of setting up
the Commission and the publicity surrounding its deliberations and
report have reinforced the popular view that the unemployment
insurance regime is overly generous and maladministered, in the sense
that it is exploited by manipulative, work-shy people. Moreover, the
report bolsters another major ideological plank of the state's attack on
labour. That is, that the inevitable and necessary economic restructuring
makes job dislocation not an evil but, rather, a logical, even a useful,
development and one for which no social blame is to be attached to
governments. The lessons are given augmented suasive force by the
simultaneous trotting out of arguments that there is a "natural" rate of
unemployment in Canada which ranges between 5 and 8 percent of the
work force. Therefore, the official unemployment rate of circa ten
percent leads to a net "real" unemployment rate of between 5 and 2
percent, which is a rather tolerable rate and one not requiring energetic
56 Commission of Inquiry on Unemployment Insurance (Ottawa: Supply and Services
Canada, 1986), (Commissioner. Claude E. Forget).
57 In addition, the Forget Commission had already lost its prestige before it reported.
It was $2 million over budget, repeatedly missed deadlines and was torn by internal wrangling
between the chairman and the two labour representatives. The latter publicly proclaimed that
they were dissociating themselves from the neo-conservative views of the chairman before the
report was published. As well, former Ford Motor Co. chairman Roy Bennett, a business
representative on the Commission, had opposed some of the Forget recommendations which
would cut unemployment insurance benefits. There was also much public discussion of (and
disgust at) the fact that the members of the Commission were paid handsome per diems ($750
per day for Forget) and that these emoluments were paid out of Unemployment Insurance
Corporation funds. The six members of the commission were paid $441,337 in salaries (of
which Forget got $175,000) and $177,201 in expenses. Eventually, the scandal forced the
government to announce that these payments were to come out of general revenue, not
unemployment insurance money; P, Poirier, "U.I. Coffers Won't Have to Bear the Cost of
$6-million Forget Commission" The [Toronto] Globe & Mail (21 February 1987) AS.
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state support for special labour market and industrial strategiesS8 It
hardly needs to be said that the fact that the so called "real" rate of
unemployment is said to be circa three percent does not alter the fact
that there are more than ten percent of the labour force unemployed,
flesh and blood human beings who are less and less well looked after
by the state. This increases both the size and the need of the reserve
army of unemployed, to the immense benefit of employers generally and
to the particular advantage of those employers in the new growth
sectors who actively seek out a labour force with low skills, employable
at low pay.59
B. Attacking Oiganizational Rights of State Employees
One simple way to reduce state expenditures is to cut the state's
wages' bill. This can be, and is, done in a variety of ways. The state
can simply resist wage demands; it is easy to do so. In Canada, public
sector employees have been permitted to unionize. This is a far cry
from saying that they have the same legal collective bargaining rights as
their private sector counterparts6 ° The right to strike is frequently not
granted (as in Ontario) or limited to certain kinds of disputes (as in the
federal sector) and, where it exists, it may suddenly be taken away by
specific legislation, often referred to as ad hoc back-to-work legislation.
58 The ideological message which enhances the state's ability to attack individual
entitlements as part of the onslaught on labour comes from many sources simultaneously. The
Royal Commission on Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (The
MacDonald Commission) called for an overhaul of Canada's unemployment insurance scheme
in order to make it more responsive to a market-driven economy. This was a principal
recommendation of that Commission. Other social welfare mechanisms were also thought to
be dispensable by The MacDonald Commission. For a critique of the Commission's political
and economic framework, see 'Ihe Right Stuff, A Critique of the MacDonald Commission
Report" (1986) 3:1 Atkinson Rev. of Canadian Studies (Special Issue).
59 The classic statement of the utility of a reserve army of labour for capital is still that
of M. Kalecki, "Political Aspects of Full Employment" (14 January 1943) Political Quarterly
322. Even after forty years his analysis has lost none of its importance and remains highly
germane to understanding state policy.
60 For a mainstream view of the differences between private and public sector bargaining,
see A. Ponak, "Public-Sector Collective Bargaining" in J. Anderson & M. Gunderson eds,
Union-Management Relations in Canada (Toronto: Addison-Wesley, 1982); M. Thompson &
G. Swimmer eds, Conflict or Compromise; The Future of Public Sector Industrial Relations
(Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1984).
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This latter method has been increasingly used over the last few years.
Between 1950 and 1965, six statutes were passed forcing workers back
to work; between 1966 and 1984, there were sixty-one such interventions
of which thirty-eight took place in the years 1979-84. The trend is
clear.61 In addition, where the right to strike does exist, the state always
retains the option to designate some employees as essential workers,
that is, as workers who will not be permitted to strike, so that the
rendering of essential services (as defined by the state) will be
uninterrupted, regardless of the legitimacy of any on-going strike. The
incidence and scope of such designations have shown a remarkable
increase with the onset of the recent crisis.62
All of this is justified on the basis that the model of private
sector collective bargaining, adapted for public sector purposes, has
economic gain as its raison d'tre. It is an institution enhancing sectoral
private interests and, as the liberal state has the task (duty) of looking
after the general welfare of the public, it is appropriate for it to deny
narrow sectoral/economic demands when its political judgment so
dictates.
This line of reasoning has legitimated the use of an even more
draconian weapon with which to attack state workers. This is the
passage of income restraint legislation aimed at public employees. Since
1982, every jurisdiction has passed such legislation, effectively denying
61 L. Panitch & D. Swartz, From Consent to Coercion: The Assault on Trade Union
Freedoms (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1985) at 32.
62 Ibid. at 42. An extreme example of repression includes the case of Newfoundland
where the legislature removed the right to strike of public servants should it designate more
than 50% of any bargaining unit as essential. This left the government free to designate up
to 50% of its work force, making the strike weapon practically useless while leaving it legally
intact. This attack on the right to strike was upheld by the court, see Newfoundland
Association of Public Employees v. The Queen in Right in Newfoundland (1985), 85 C.L.L.C.
14,020 (Nfld. S.C.). In a similar way, the federal government's right to designate, unilaterally,
all members of any of its bargaining units was upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Canadian Air Traffic Control Association v. R (1982), 82 C.L.L.C. 14,191, a case in which all
of Canada's air traffic controllers were designated and denied the right to strike. Note how
the courts, as a supposedly autonomous organ of the state, "neutrally" reinforce the state's
concrete and ideological attack. The federal Treasury Board has recently proposed to extend
the number of public sector employees designated as essential and, therefore, not empowered
to strike. It is also proposing to have arbitrators, who are to determine wage disputes when
there is no right to a strike, take into account government fiscal policies; see The [Toronto]
Globe & Mail (14 January 1987). For a more detailed account see H. Glasbeek, "Labour
Relations Policy and Law as Mechanisms of Adjustment" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L. J. 179.
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collective bargaining fights to Canadian public servants. 63 While statutes
restraining public service unions have the direct advantage of reducing
state expenditures, their most telling effect is that of demonstrating to
private sector employers the propriety and legitimacy of attacking the
rights and conditions of their workers. Thus, when the Public Service
Alliance of Canada argued in court that anti-strike legislation removed
its fundamental freedom of association without justification, the
government's formal response was that there was justification because,
while there was no evidence that public servant wages were the
vanguard of unacceptable inflationary trends, wage rates in the private
sector needed to be restrained. The public employees' restraint was
meant to be a symbolic demonstration of the need to be tough on
wages.
64
C. Attack by the State on its Employees - Slimming the Work Force
The state sector is labour intensive. In recent times, different
levels of government have announced that they are planning to reduce
the number of their employees drastically.65 While the state cannot
move its operations, as the newly mobile capitalists are able to do, it can
privatize by selling profitable crown corporations (and it has -
DeHavilland, Canadair, Urban Transit Development Corporation), and
by permitting state services to be delivered by non-profit voluntary
organizations or private sector contractors.66 This has a dual effect.
63 L. Panitch & D. Swartz, supra, note 61, Appendix IA. This led the director of the
International Labour Organization, Francis Blanchard, to recommend, after a fact-finding tour
by a committee of the agency, that the provinces of Ontario, Newfoundland, Alberta and
British Columbia withdraw their restraining statutes as they infringed the norms of
international conventions; The Toronto Star (19 March 1986).
64 See factum of the Respondents (the federal government) submitted to the Supreme
Court of Canada in Public Servant Alliance of Canada v. The Queen in Right of Canada as
Represented by Treasury Board and the A.G. of Canada (1987), 87 C.L.L.C. 14,022 (S.C.C.).
65 For instance, after it was re-elected in 1987, the Saskatchewan government announced
that it would cut its public services, such as the Human Rights Commission and the like, to
the bone.
66 An overview of this aspect of the state attack on social welfare programmes is found
in J. Calvert, supra, note 53. In addition, hospitals, schools, libraries, and municipalities facing
budget constraints are '\velcoming unprecedented numbers" of people who are jobless and who
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First; the state's work force will be reduced. Second, a pool of needy,
experienced workers will become available to private service contractors
who will pick up the slack created by the reduction of state services.
If hired, these people will now work in lower-paying, lower-security
situations than they did before.
IV. CANADIAN LABOUR'S RESPONSE TO THE NEW
FORDISM
Our characterization of what has been happening emphasizes
that both capital and the Canadian state seem bent on responding to
the pressures of unregulated competition with a view to retaining high
profit yields by reducing labour's share and standing. Inasmuch as new
technology is used to enter into this competition, the work force will
become simply the arms and legs of the new computer-based production
technologies, despite much talk to the contrary. It is unlikely that there
will be an attempt to upgrade the qualifications of workers so that,
generally-speaking, workers become the controllers of the work process
rather than the other way around.67 As a consequence, high profits may
be returned to those employers who succeed and some high wages may
be earned by some well-placed workers. But, there will be no creation
of the basis needed for the resumption of mass consumer demand which
could avoid the consequences of new fordism in Canada which we have
catalogued, namely that, overall we would expect,
(i) greater and increasing inequality between workers,
(ii) continued long-term unemployment,
want to do something socially useful as volunteer workers. This presents public sector unions
with a delicate political problem as it is difficult to attack "do-gooders;" see "Volunteers
Stealing Jobs Union Says" The Toronto Star (11 January 1985) AS.
67 Although in the text we have noted that some workers will gain control over the work
process by being requalified, it is our reading of the Canadian situation (as a result of
interviews with the likes of Woodbridge Foam Company, supra, note 20, and being persuaded
by Don Wells' description of the new work processes, supra, note 14) that for most sectors
of the the economy an overall diminution of worker discretion rather than an augmentation
of it will be the norm. This fits in with Alain Lipietz's observations about developments in
North America and much of Europe, as opposed to Japan and Sweden where the new
production techniques do lead to a generally more skilled and in-control workforce; see,
"Globalization of the General Crisis of Fordism, 1967-84" supra, note 2.
546 [VOL. 27 NO. 3
The New Fordism In Canada
(iii) lack of job security for the employed, as well as new oppressive
work processes together with,
(iv) a reduction in social entitlements engineered by a state responsive
to employers' needs.68
Thus far, employers and the state have been able to follow a
route which leads Canada in the directions described above without
meeting all that much opposition from labour. This is primarily due to
the institutionally embedded fragmentation of organized labour.
A. The Inherent Weaknesses of Canadian Labour
The scheme of collective bargaining in Canada is one which is
based on notions which presume a truly competitive market economy.
The central idea is that the workers in one enterprise are permitted to
collectivize and use their economic power vis- -vis that particular
employer. That is, organized economic bargaining is severely limited in
scope. The collectivization which has taken place has kept employer-
labour relations as closely wedded to the pure market model, (that is,
one which envisages a multitude of atomized employment settings), as
it is possible to do while allowing unionization something of a legitimate
role.
°6
While the ideological framework of North American collective
bargaining is based on the ideal of a non-oligopolistic, non-monopolistic
market economy, the introduction of the now prevailing scheme
coincided with the advent of Keynesian policies within what was to be
a regulated capitalist economy, one in which unbridled, uncontrolled
competition was not to be left alone to do its "thing." Simply put, the
U.S. WagnerAct was part of the Keynesian package known as the New
Deal. When Canada accepted a modem form of legitimated collective
Note here that conditions which are a real crisis for the working classes do not
necessarily denote that there is a crisis for capitalism. The contemporary period, from
capitalism's point of view, can be seen as a restructuring one leading to a maintenance of
capitalism and, perhaps, its invigorated perpetuation. For capitalism's ability to adapt, see
R.L. Heilbroner, The Nature and Logic of Capitalism (New York: Norton, 1985).
69 H. Glasbeek, "Labour Relations Policy and Law as a Mechanism of Adjustment" supra,
note 62; D. Drache, "he Instrumental Role of Labour in a Staples Economy" [unpublished,
1987], (available from author on request).
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bargaining, it was the U.S. institutional framework which was adopted.
Not unnaturally it was perceived as a Keynesian instrument. For some
time the falsity of this was not apparent.
The concrete economic situation in which bargaining took place
after World War II was largely a non-competitive one. The bulk of
private sector unionization was, and is, to be found in the monopolistic
and oligopolistic segments of the economy. That is, collective bargaining
had been taking place in what were then the faster growing sectors of
the economy which, by and large, were capital intensive, e.g., some of
the resource industries, and the automobile, steel, and chemical
industries. Gains were made because of these employers' need to retain
stability in productivity while there was great demand for their goods
and products. They had the ability to pass on the cost of obtaining
relatively stable conditions."0 In these (post-war to circa 1976) buoyant
times for well-placed unions, it was possible to make wage gains which
spilled over into other sectors. Thus, collective bargaining of the
Wagner Act-type had all the appearance of being a system capable of
bringing home the bacon.7
1
But there was always the flip side to this coin. Hidden from
view was the fact that the tenets of free enterprise as carried on in an
atomized market had always been retained as the ideological sub-
structure of North America-style collective bargaining.72 There had
always been an unconfronted, but inherent, problem: how would the
scheme respond if real competition ever raised its ugly head? This
would be the collective bargaining regime's real testing time. That
testing time is now.
As argued in the introduction, as competition becomes fiercer
internationally, pressed Canadian employers will take advantage of the
embedded logic of the intensely fragmented kind of collective bargaining.
They will confront their workers, more often than before, on a local-
70 The size and scope of labours advances in these sectors are documented by U. Zohar,
Canadian Manufacturing: A Study in Productivity and Technological Change (Toronto: James
Lorimer, 1982).
71 S. Jamieson, Industrial Conflict in Canada, 1966-75 (Ottawa: Economic Council of
Canada, 1979); for a business view, see B. Goldman & J. Maxwell, "'Wage Developments in
Canada: The Pressure to Catch Up" (Montreal: C.D. Howe Research Institute, March, 1975).
72 See The Report of the Task Force on Labour Relations (The Woods' Connission) Final
Report, (Ottawa: Privy Council, 1968) at paras. 22-37.
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by-local basis, with implicit or explicit threats of de-investment and/or the
introduction of work-displacing new technologies. Trade unions,
organized on a basis which legally obliges them to stay within the
framework of plant-by-plant bargaining, increasingly will be faced with
tougher situations. There are already signs that employers will be able
to insist that guarantees of collective powers, of the kind the Wagner
Act-type legislation was thought to provide, be diluted. In particular,
over recent times we have seen labour's (already) limited power to
impose secondary boycotts further curtailed; national bargaining patterns
which have existed for a long time and which had operated to permit
a maintenance of parity in industries (as in the meat packing sectors)
have increasingly been broken-up; some employers have been permitted
to escape the successor rights of unions which had, in the immediate
past, enabled unions to ensure that gains could be maintained once they
had been won, even if the ownership of an enterprise changed; where
employers had been faced by region-wide or industry-wide union co-
ordinated activities which had enabled the union, once it had obtained
wage benefits at the expense of one or more competitive employers, to
have them apply throughout the industry, employers now have been
permitted to form a united front (as in the lumber industry in British
Columbia and the construction one in Ontario) to help them lessen the
leverage that such unionization gave workers. The state has aided
capital in obtaining these advantages by direct statutory inverventions
and by employer-favouring decision-making by regulatory labour relations
boards.73
The undermining of workers' rights has been easy to justify
because the newly emerging arrangements do not depart from the
ideology of the competitive model on which the original collective
bargaining framework was built, an ideology which has gained a new
respectability.74 What is happening, however, is that Canada is, in fact,
73 For fuller detailing, see, H. Glasbeek, supra, note 62.
74 As noted earlier, The MacDonald Commission has played a key role in legitimating
the neo-conservative business agenda; see text of note 58. Right wing business institutes, such
as the Fraser Institute of Vancouver B.C., publish a constant stream of academic studies which
blame Canada's high unemployment levels on either supposedly overly generous unemployment
insurance benefits or high wage levels in industry, or both. This is the thrust of a new report,
released with much fanfare, written by two economists, H. Grubel & J. Bonnici, Why is
Canada's Unemployment Rate So High? (Vancouver Fraser Institute, 1986).
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keeping only some of the institutional collective bargaining arrangements
which had existed previously. The surviving ones will look the same,
that is, there will be a form of collective bargaining, but what people will
be bargaining for will be different because employers no longer have the
need to promote institutional arrangements geared toward promoting a
high wage/high productivity economy.75 But some of the Keynesian
aspects of former times will still be attractive to the employers. In
particular, the institutional make-up of capitalism will still require the
participation of trade unions. It is to be remembered that trade unions
have proven to be very efficient labour-market organizers for large scale
capital, especially between 1940 and 1976, and that they are very
important for the enhancement of productivity growth by promoting
stability in the relations between labour and capital wherever mass
production takes place. This will remain true even when the ability of
trade unions to bring large gains to employees has been reduced.
Further, the perception that it is trade unions who are to act on behalf
of workers will be promoted by organized labour.76 The system will
impose the same structural roles and ideological obligations upon unions
as it always has, but now the unions will be less capable of delivering
the "goods" to workers than before.77
75 See works referred to in note 1.
76 That labour will make this argument is evident. Shirley Carr, the president of the
Canadian Labour Congress recently told business leaders that the labour movement is willing
to work hand-in-hand with the business community if it is treated with respect. As reported
in The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (18 November 1986), she is willing to sit down and talk to
"corporate Canada" despite the fact that there might be rank-and-file opposition from union
members to this course of action. The real danger is that organized labour will accept a
corporatist kind of solution instead of combatting the dualization of society and of the
economy. For an important critique of the changing role of unions in the economy, see A.
Gorz, "The Socialism of Tomorrow" (1986) 67 Telos at 199-206.
77 American commentators link the sharp increases in the growth in social inequality and
the skewing of income distribution to the rout of American unions; see "U.S. Rich and Poor
Increase in Numbers; Middle Loses Ground" The Wall Street Journal (18 September 1986).
For Canada, growing social inequality is linked to the cutbacks in social welfare programs.
Consult chaps.1, 5, and 6 in The "Other"MacDonald Report, supra, note 6. This is confirmed
by a study commissioned by the IMF in which it was reported that Canada is one of the
lowest spender on social programmes among the West's biggest industrial countries; The
Toronto Star (30 September 1986).
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B. Canadian Labour's Response So Far
Labour has been seeking ways to overcome its difficulties. In
particular, there has been a notable tendency towards nationalistic self-
assertion by labour.
In this part of the world the most dramatic effect of the new
international economic order is the decline of the U.S.'s hegemony
78
Neither American capital nor the state is accepting this diminution in
influence and power with grace. Their resistance has put tremendous
pressure on American organized labour. However, for it, a renewed
Keynesian compromise does not seem a realistic goal. Certainly,
Canadian labour does not see this as a likely outcome of the U.S.
restructuring.
Until fairly recently, the major Canadian resource and
manufacturing unions were branches of American unions, more often
than not accepting their American bretheren's economic and political
world views. National unionism was considered quaint and futile. This
is no longer so. Indeed, two of Canadian unionisms' responses to new
fordism are, in part, attributable to its changed attitude towards U.S.
economic and political policies and towards American unionism.
The first is that Canadian unions, not wanting to be integrated
into American-style restructuring, have formed a cohesive and aggressive
front to fight against the Canadian state's attempt to reach a
comprehensive free trade deal with the U.S. Such coalescence is
unusual, given on the one hand, the highly fragmented nature of
Canadian unionism and, on the other, the pervasive influence of
American unions. The second development has been the increased
movement towards a separation of Canadian trade unions from their
American parent bodies. The most signflcant divorces in recent times
have been the splits in the automobile workers', the woodworkers' and
the Newfoundland fishermen's unions (the latter were members of the
American Food and Commercial Workers Union).79
78 R. Edwards, P. Garonna & F. Todtling eds, Unions in Crisis and Beyond: Perspectives
from Six Countries (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1986).
79 We acknowledge that there were many reasons for these disaffiliations, but whatever
other factors were operative, it is unlikely that they would have been sufficient in themselves
to lead to these significant splits. The understanding of what it might mean to be hitched
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While the attacks on the private sector have led unions to form
new coalitions and to restructure themselves, the attempts to dismantle
the welfare state also have become a flash point for workers' militancy
and opposition. Thus, in British Columbia, Quebec, and Newfoundland,
public sector unions have spearheaded mass campaigns and have been
part of popular sector coalitions which have sought to mobilize the
public at large against repressive labour legislation and cutbacks in social
spending. While it is true that the successes have been minimal, the
potential is not totally unpromising8 °
The invigorated nationalist sentiment amongst unions, the
opposition to free trade and the growing conciousness of the possiblities
of large-scale mobilization by allying unions with the popular sectors all
indicate that, in Canada, in contrast with the situation in the U.S.A.,
neither organized labour nor populist sentiment can be taken for
granted by business or government. Co-ordinated activity calling for a
new set of political and social ententes, therefore, may have a fertile
field in which to plow. What is needed to help realize this potential is
a politics of consciousness which seeks to make the most of the
opportunities offered by organizing around the concrete issues and
difficulties presented by the new economic circumstance. The rest of
this paper will try to spell out what the elements of such organization
might entail. The focus will be on devising stratagems suggested by the
scenarios set out in this paper. The purpose is not to ask people to do
things which their circumstances make difficult or illogical, a failing
endemic to most calls for a new politics of the working classes. We
accept the fact that, given our political economy's institutional
arrangements, the first concern of all groups of workers must be to
defend their own (rather narrow) interests. All that we seek to do is
to identify the likely nature of their predicaments and how, in resolving
them, they can contribute to the general good of the working classes.
onto a falling economic star has been the catalyst.
80 The role of the popular sector in shaping public debate is described in D. Drache &
D.Cameron, supra, note 6; see particularly the Introduction.
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1. The general proposition
Two of the chief ingredients of the new fordism are the
increased mobility of capital and the employers' need to make the most
use of it. In Canada, employers, seeking to compete with low wage
nations, use their control over capital (and technology) as a way to
attack labour. In this setting, the state is more than ever the captive
of business and responds positively to its demands. In order for labour
to get more control over capital investment in Canada ( a prerequiste
to counter the attack on labour) it will be necessary to put the state in
the position where it wants to control capital and be willing to use its
legitimacy to do so. This will require a breakthrough that cannot be
achieved through simple reliance on electoral politics s 2 What has to be
created is a set of political attitudes which are so pervasive that they will
permit the development of new ideological structures which will make
the control of the Canadian economy by Canadians an acceptable goal.
It is only when such control is gained that the Canadian state can
sensibly address the potential of responding to the new economic order
by deploying technology to improve both production and work
conditions while maintaining working class welfare. This will require
policies which do not seek to respond to the new international
competition by competing on the wages' front, but rather, will rely on
industrial strategies which make the most of Canada's natural resource
and manpower advantages. This, of course, does not mean that shocks
or displacements can be avoided in Canada. Rather, their incidence can
be lessened and their effects ameliorated. In a context in which the
response to new fordism is not to make labour bear the bulk of the
costs of restructuring, it will be possible to conceive of a more
productive workforce producing the same or more general welfare. For
instance, it will become realistic to implement policies which allow for
the shortening of the work week without cutting wages and/or which
provide more social welfare for those who must be displaced. If this is
81 E. Kierans, Globalism and the Nation-State, C.B.C. Massey Lecture Series, (Toronto:
C.B.C. Enterprises, 1984).
82 For a fine exposition of the kind of democracy that must be reached for, see F.
Cunningham, "Participation, Parties and Parliaments" (1986) 7 Socialist Studies Bulletin at 9-
34.
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utopian, it sounds so because there is no way to conceive of such a
world from within a framework which sees capital's right to look after
itself as necessary and unchallengeable. New macro-economic policies
will only evolve if this framework is abandoned. To create the new kind
of politics it must be understood by unions and workers that in each
struggle, when choices are available, the tactic chosen should be the one
most likely to further the case of a coherent policy aimed at wresting
control from capital. To this end we offer the following strategies.
2. Using the employers' pleas for more flexibility to give workers
control
As noted, workers will be faced with demands to accept new
forms of wage payments and more flexible production work techniques.
The very logic of these employer demands have in them, however, the
seeds which will allow workers to make compatible, but potentially
radical, counterproposals. In particular, as employers argue that new
technologies and quality of working life circles and work teams will lead
to increased productivity and, hence, better wages, workers will be in a
position to say that, if one of the purposes is to improve the quality of
the product by increasing the amount of control that workers are to
exercise over both quantitative and qualitative aspects of production, it
makes sense to allow workers to participate, directly, in the planning of
production and in respect of the introduction of new technologies.
These worker demands are made plausible precisely because employers
claim that they are not interested in browbeating workers but rather in
making the enterprise more competitive for, inter alia, the benefit of
their valued work force.
In this context, it does not seem politically naive to suggest that,
should unions consciously resolve to make demands for increased worker
participation in the investment and planning processes a central concern
in all bargaining they undertake, it will yield positive results in several
ways. If organized workers can put such demands for increased control
on bargaining agendas as a matter of routine, both employers and
workers will come to see that it is natural that the way new work
methods and payments might affect work conditions should be central
bargaining issues. Workers will be able to argue, with new-found
plausibility, that, as their control, dignity and job satisfaction are meant
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to be increased, (as productivity is enhanced), the new work methods
and technologies should be tailored, for instance, to relieve stress and
to diminish health and safety dangers. As some workers will be given
more control over production lines because the new technology requires
this, employers will have to empower them to stop production when
the machinery fails. Building on this, workers should be able to claim
that, because the new methods are supposed to improve their daily lot,
they should be permitted to stop production not only when profits are
at risk, but also when their safety is endangered. For workers
themselves this would be a breakthrough, as they do not yet believe that
they have a right to control work to that extent. Once they cross that
threshold, it may not seem as far-fetched to them, as it does now, to
launch claims that they have the right to learn new skills to make them
more truly mobile in a changing economic environment which clearly
will provide less job security than the earlier Keynesian economy did.
The argument, then, is that, in bargaining, unions faced with
the imposition of new work methods should take the arguments urging
them to accept the new reality and use the logic embedded in them to
educate their members. While one cannot be sanguine about the
number of concrete successes which can be won by such tactics, the idea
is to find a way to use the new circumstances to give workers a fresh
vision of what non-hierarchically organized work could be like and how
raw capitalism hinders the attainment of such a different kind of work
environment. This could encourage workers to question what is, in
Canada, the largely untrammelled prerogative of management.
3. Finding a counterweight to capital mobility and power - workers
controlling workers' capital
At the same time as these difficult, fragmented struggles go on,
it will be necessary to advocate a stratagem which goes directly towards
limiting the power employers gain from capital mobility. Obtaining
control over private pension plans is this stratagem.
Again, the argument can be made from within the confines of
the current industrial relations' climate. The point is simple: pension
funds are accumulations of invested workers' wages (whether the
employer pays the contribution which he could have paid directly as
wages or the employees contribute directly to the funds). There is no
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conventional legal, economic or political argument (although there are
many so-called "practical" ones) which suggest that workers should not
control their own wages' funds8 3 Indeed, the contrary is true. Yet, the
demand would be a controversial one. This would be so because
pension funds represent a considerable percentage of the capital funds
available for investment in Canadar 4 Workers' control over such funds,
with the specific intent to enhance job security, equality of treatment
and social welfare, would present a serious threat to the power of
employers gained from the existence of the almost unfettered mobility
of capital. Of course, to be effective as a counterweight to capital,
wages' funds should be pooled8 5
4. Public sector employees as leaders
The dismantling of the welfare state has stimulated segments
of the population adversely affected by de-regulation into forming
popular coalitions. Potentially these groups represent a large number
of people. The attacks on their rights help to underscore their
perception that there is a need to form linkages between the protection
of their particular interests and those of the rest of the population. For
instance, it ought to become much more apparent to women's groups
83 Indeed, just now it is politically easy to make such an argument because some
particularly greedy employers have exploited a loophole in Canadian pension legislation to
appropriate so-called surpluses in pension plans to their own use. The "surpluses" have arisen
as a result of a combination of high interest rates, booms on the stock market and declining
payrolls; the funds have more money in them than is actuarially needed to pay the benefits
likely to have to be paid to the existing work force. Canadian companies withdrew $290
million from employees' pension funds in 1985 alone. This has squarely raised the issue, in
a very public way, as to who owns the money in the pension funds. See The Financial Post
(30 August 1986), The Toronto Star (30 August 1986), and The IToronto] Globe and Mail (12
January 1987). The Ontario government has imposed a moratorium on the employer practice
of snatching surpluses, pending the report of a commission of inquiry into the issue.
84 Trusteed pension assets totalled circa $85 billion in 1983 and total related pension
assets reached an estimated $196 billion or the equivalent of one-third of Canada's G.N.P.;
see M. MacDonald & J. Perry, Pension Funds and Venture Capital: the Critical Links between
Savings, Investnen4 Technology and Jobs (Ottawa: Science Council of Canada, 1985).
85 Even if the movement towards workers' control over pension funds fails, it would
nonetheless have an important educational value provided it was the result of a co-ordinated
series of demands. It creates the spectre of capital having to accommodate labour in both
the private bargaining and the political spheres.
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that their ability to attain equality in treatment will be severely inhibited
by attacks on unionization in precisely those sectors where women are
likely to be employed in large numbers. Similarly, attacks on
unemployment insurance and welfare, leading to a larger army of
immiserated people, will undermine the bargaining power of those
people who are employed. It becomes easier for those groups which
represent the under-classes to see that attacks on the organized sectors
of the work force may well take the shape of attacks on the poor and
the unorganized. The need to form coalitions should become clearer
to them. As a corollary, the pressures created by the
internationalization of production and liberalization of trade will force
the production workers in the private sector to confront the dangers of
the availability of a large army of unemployed and poorly paid people.
The need for coalitions with these under-classes should become
increasingly manifest to them as well. A question remains: how can
those incipient needs for coalescence be translated into effective, co-
ordinated action?
One of the central points of this paper has been that the state
has been leading the way in finding a way to help capital to satisfy its
aims in the new economic order. In order to do so it has sought to cut
state expenditures to the detriment of non-propertied people. In
addition, it has attacked its own employees with a vengeance. This puts
its own employees in the forefront of the struggle. Both for their own
protection and for the good of all workers, it seems logical to urge that
public sector workers seek to identify their interests with those of the
state's clienteles. In ideological terms this will help reveal the artificiality
of the supposed clear and natural demarcation between the public and
the private spheres, a demarcation which helps perpetuate the status
quo. More directly, it will help the public employees themselves in their
immediate fights with their employer, as well as supporting the
preservation of the social entitlements of non-propertied workers. This
requires some elaboration.
First, the state's clienteles will be helped by public sector
workers making arguments for greater state expenditures. Note that
for public sector workers to act in this way will be deemed extraordinary
in Canada. But such agitation can be presented as perfectly legitimate
in the light of theories of liberal democracy to which the Canadian state
pays lip service. The state's cienteles are comprised by a number of
small constituencies which do not have easy access to information and
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which have very little political-lobbying power. For state workers to
help them by providing them with the necessary information and
publicity for their claims would enhance their political power vis- -vis the
bulk of the taxpayers who are to foot the bill for any state largesse to
particular groups. For public sector workers to ally themselves with
such uninfluential groups, then, can be characterized as the necessary
creation of countervailing political power, the essence of the kind of
liberal pluralistic politics which the Canadian state claims to espouse.
The second benefit obtained by public sector employees
engaging in political action on behalf of the general public is that they
will reap direct economic advantages from such conduct. This is easily
illustrated. When teachers bargain with their employers they should
make it clear that their struggle is one for better education, as well as
for better pay. They should ask public sector workers everywhere to
support their demands because this helps the public sector employees
involved retain employment, as well as enhancing educational facilities
for all non-propertied people in society. To underscore their sincerity,
teachers ought to oppose all proposals for cutbacks in education, even
if their own wages or security are not directly threatened. Again, if the
issue is one of restraint of health care programmes, cutbacks in
unemployment insurance, publicly funded pensions or day-care
programmes, similar arguments can be made. The logic is
straightforward: the retention, or better the expansion, of the state's
services enhances public servants' job security. But there is another
beneficial aspect to such public employees' support for state services.
Public sector employees will be seen to be defending all workers'
rights when they defend education, and health services, day-care and
pensions. This would be an important signal to private sector workers
who, in the past, have accepted ds a given that all such benefits stem
from their efforts as private bargainers which, in due course, have
pressured the state to make privately-won benefits universally available.
This has made for a cool relationship between private and public sector
workers. It would be easier for private sector workers to perceive the
common interest of all working class groupings (whether they are in the
paid work force or not), if public sector workers could be seen to be
militant allies of the state's welfare clienteles and determined to promote
the interest of all workers. This would be a very long ideological step
forward. It would aid in developing the understanding that inequalities
and insecurities can best be countered by gaining control over state
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mechanisms and the development of national industrial strategies rather
than through private bargaining in an ad hoc, fragmented way.
VI. FINAL WORD
The new fordism presents labour with contradictory messages
and implications. It has been made to appear necessary and inevitable.
It will bring some benefits to some segments of the work force. But,
overall, it is a means by which capitalism, harshly and brutally, seeks to
maintain and perpetuate itself in a meaner, leaner way.
By identifying the various scenarios with which differing sectors
of the working class will have to deal, it becomes clearer that
fragmented bargaining, on the basis of institutional frameworks which
reflect the tenets of free-market ideology, will enhance capital/state
efforts to create the kind of environment in which workers' rights and
benefits can be, and will be, seriously diluted. Any form of resistance,
therefore, must have as its central aim an overcoming of the
fragmentation which has been the basis of Canada's Capital-State-
Labour relationships. The fragmentation exists not only between the
unionized and the non-unionized, but also between unionized and other
unionized workers, between public and private sector workers, and arises
out of the general acceptance of the artificial separation of the
economic and the political spheres. This paper's emphasis is that, on a
daily basis, workers will have to respond to the new fordism strategies
from within these multi-fragmented settings. Yet, while this puts them
at a tremendous disadvantage, it may also help the working classes and
popular sectors to find a new resonance for what is needed: an
ideological coalescence, an understanding that workers should not
continue to seek benefits at each other's expense. They may be aided
in this by the fact that fighting battles in the traditional institutional
frameworks, that is, in isolated settings, will largely fail. Increasingly,
this may disabuse large numbers of the working classes and the popular
sectors of the idea that they should adhere to the existing
political/economic forms and practices. It is in this spirit that the
analyses and proposals made in this paper are offered. We believe that
there will be an instinctive search for new ways. To be successful,
strategies must be based on proper understandings and consciousness.
It is only a linking of the interests of the people at the point of
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production with those of people in other sectors which can lead to any
kind of successful resistance, a resistance which eventually might lead to
radical change. The proposals made herein are merely examples of the
kinds of stratagems that must be considered by activists. What will
actually be done will, no doubt, depend on people's understanding,
needs, power and consciousness. But, as something will be done,
because it must be done, it ought to be done purposefully. The idea is
to win.
